

Historical Contextualisation of the Word *Loyalty* in the Discourse of the European Parliament*

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This article is an analysis of the meaning of the word *loyalty* in the discourse of the European Parliament. The European Parliamentary Assembly of the European Economic Community and Euratom replaced the Common Assembly of the European Coal and Steel Community. The European Parliament met for the first time in 1958, and initially had a primarily consultative function. However, in the following years, its power increased, and the Maastricht, Amsterdam and Lisbon Treaties transformed it into a legislative body. Together with the Commission, the Council, and the Court of Justice, it forms the complex multi-, inter- and supranational institutional framework of the European Union. Parliamentary discourse can be defined as an argumentative communication genre characterised by official and unofficial preconditions. This article examines how *loyalty* is defined and described in the international parliamentary deliberative discourse with respect to various demands, values, and interests. The research was based on 50 instances of the word *loyalty* taken from the *European Parliament Proceedings Parallel Corpus 1996–2011*, accessed through the web-based system for corpus analysis *CQPweb* — *Lancaster University*. The article identifies six meanings of the word *loyalty* in accordance with the co-text provided by the evidence of quotations and examines the historical context of the development of the European Parliament. The aim of the analysis is to show that a better understanding of the meaning of *loyalty* in the discourse of the European Parliament depends on the historical contextualisation.

Keywords: historical context, loyalty, meaning, the European Parliament discourse.

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Историческая контекстуализация значений слова *лояльность* в дискурсе Европейского парламента*

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В статье предпринимается комплексный анализ значений лояльности в европейском парламентском дискурсе с учетом исторической перспективы. На смену Европейскому объединению угля и стали пришли сразу две организации: Европейское парламентское объединение угля и стали и Европейское сообщество по атомной энергии. Как известно, Европейский парламент собрался на свою первую сессию в 1958 г. и поначалу имел исключительно консультативные функции. Однако в последующие годы его полномочия расширялись, а после подписания Маастрихтского, Амстердамского и Лиссабонского договоров приобрели статус законодательных. Совместно с Еврокомиссией, Европейским советом и Европейским судом Европарламент образует действующую систему межгосударственных учреждений Европейского союза. В этом смысле парламентский дискурс может быть классифицирован в качестве специфического коммуникативного жанра, отражающего аргументированные суждения, контролируемые не только официальными, но и неинституциональными инстанциями. В статье предпринимается комплексный анализ различных вариантов использования понятия «лояльность» в делиберативном парламентском дискурсе на рубеже XX и XXI столетий с учетом различных контекстов, связанных с ценностными ориентирами, политическими запросами, а также интересами современного европейского парламентского сообщества. Автор строит свои выводы на использовании представительной выборки из 50 случаев употребления этого термина, почерпнутой из «European Parliament Proceedings Parallel Corpus 1996–2011», доступ к которой стал возможным благодаря базе данных «CQPweb — Ланкастерский университет». Автором идентифицированы шесть основных значений лояльности, которые извлечены из базы данных и соответствуют историческим условиям развития и становления Европейского парламента. В статье показано, что адекватное понимание этих значений лояльности в европейском парламентском дискурсе возможно лишь с учетом их исторической контекстуализации.

Ключевые слова: исторический контекст, лояльность, значение лояльности, европейский парламентский дискурс.

Parliamentary discourse is inherently an argumentative communicative activity type¹. The institutional point of parliamentary debates is “to create clarity concerning the various political positions regarding a policy at issue”². Argumentation in parliamentary debates is guided by institutional preconditions, and two types of these rules can be distinguished: generally official, *primary* preconditions, and generally unofficial, *secondary*

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¹ Eemeren F. H., van. Strategic Maneuvering in Argumentative Discourse: Extending the pragma-dialectical theory of argumentation. Amsterdam; Philadelphia, 2010. P. 145.

² Eemeren F. H., van, Henkemaans A. F. S. Argumentation: Analysis and Evaluation. New York; London, 2017. P. 152.

preconditions. For example, in the plenary debate of the European Parliament (henceforward the EP), “standing orders”, controlled by the Chair, are *primary* institutional preconditions. The “European predicament”, which refers to the situation that Members of the European Parliament (henceforward MEPs) need to combine serving the interest of, on the one hand, the European Union and, on the other hand, of their home countries, is an example of *secondary* institutional preconditions³.

Similarly, S. Hix notices that, “As in all democratic polities, demands in the EU arise from a complex network of public and private groups, each competing to influence the EU policy process to promote or protect their own interests and desires”⁴. The statement agrees with the definition of parliamentary discourse as an essentially argumentative communicative activity type and also implies that parliamentarians may resort to strategic manoeuvring, i. e. the continual efforts to maintain the balance between reasonableness and effectiveness, when arguing for and against viewpoints⁵. This suggests that parliamentary discourse can be viewed from both dialectical and rhetorical perspectives.

The present article examines how the word *loyalty* can be defined and represented in the EP discourse in connection with the expected differences in MEPs’ standpoints, arguments, values, and interests. The research included 50 instances of the use of the word *loyalty* taken from the *European Parliament Proceedings Parallel Corpus 1996–2011*⁶, accessed by means of the web-based tool for corpus analysis *CQPweb — Lancaster University*⁷. *CQPweb* gives access to various corpora and allows for the following analysis options: concordancing, collocations, distribution tables and charts, frequency lists, as well as keywords and key tags⁸.

Context and definitions

The word *context* can be defined in two ways: as a part of a text where a word, phrase or term is used, which is known as a verbal context or co-text, or as the circumstances that a word, phrase or term is associated with, which is a situational context or environment⁹. The second definition highlights that the context can extend beyond the text, and that it is important to contextualise language use, i. e., to understand external circumstances in which communication occurs as well as characteristics of different communicative domains and genres of language use.

In relation to this, in lexicography, for example, Hanks¹⁰ proposed *the Corpus Pattern Analysis (CPA)*, a new approach to identifying the meaning of words. This method relies

³ *Eemeren F.H., van, Henkemans A.F.S.* Argumentation: Analysis and Evaluation. P. 157.

⁴ *Hix S.* The Political System of the European Union. Houndmills; Basingstoke; Hampshire, 2005. P. 3.

⁵ *Eemeren F.H., van.* Strategic Maneuvering in Argumentative Discourse. P. 40.

⁶ See: European Parliament Proceedings Parallel Corpus 1996–2011. Available at: <https://www.statmt.org/europarl/> (accessed: 09.07.2023). Detailed information about the corpus is provided by: *Koehn P.* Europarl: A Parallel Corpus for Statistical Machine Translation. The Tenth Machine Translation Summit Proceedings of Conference. [S.l.], 2005. P. 79–86.

⁷ See: *CQPweb* at Lancaster (Corpus Query Processor). Available at: <https://cqpweb.lancs.ac.uk/> (accessed: 09.07.2023).

⁸ *Hardie A.* *CQPweb — combining power, flexibility and usability in a corpus analysis tool* // International Journal of Corpus Linguistics. 2012. Vol. 17 (3). P. 380. — See the article for more information about this corpus analysis system.

⁹ *Hartmann R. R. K., James G.* Dictionary of lexicography. London, New York, 1998. P. 29.

¹⁰ *Hanks P.* Corpus evidence and electronic lexicography // Electronic Lexicography. Oxford, 2012. P. 68.

on the idea that words have ‘meaning potential’, not meaning *per se*, and that words have to be put into context before their meaning is defined. Namely, different contexts trigger different components of the meaning potential, but, of course, context is not infinitely variable. To sum up, the meaning is identified both with regard to collocations (the immediate co-text) and semantic frames, the latter being the real-world context in which a word is used¹¹. As regards historical dictionaries, the identification of meaning is evidence-based. In relation to this, Hawke¹² states that James Murray, believing that the historical development of the different senses of words could be identified from the evidence and that the semantic development could be followed chronologically through the quotations, adopted the principle for the *OED* that dictionary definitions should be based on the evidence of quotations.

Parliamentary discourse

Eemeren and Henkemans¹³ differentiate between four communicative domains: legal, political, academic, and interpersonal communication. Parliamentary discourse is ‘a sub-genre of political language and represents its most formal and institutionalised variety’¹⁴. As it has already been mentioned, parliamentary discourse and deliberation can be discussed with reference to both dialectical and rhetorical frameworks, and not only with reference to these two frameworks. Hitchcock¹⁵ discusses three perspectives on argument and reasoning: dialectical, rhetorical, and epistemological perspectives, and there may be other perspectives. Firstly, a dialectical perspective treats argument and reasoning as dialogues. Secondly, a rhetorical perspective means that argument and reasoning are used to achieve the acceptance of a point of view. Thirdly, an epistemological perspective means that argument and reasoning are ‘private acts of working out for oneself the truth of the matter’.

Generally, parliamentary debates integrate all three perspectives. More specifically, as stated by Hitchcock¹⁶, they belong to prescriptive dialectical systems. As further explained, prescriptive dialectical systems have a long history and include various types, such as legal proceedings, Socratic inquiries, parliamentary debates, discussions of academic papers, negotiations, etc. These systems are similar in the sense that they have restrictions which help the participants achieve their goals. However, these systems can also be different: some are only theoretical, while others have already been practiced; some are loosely defined, while others — more narrowly; some are explicit, while others are “implicit in routinized practices”.

In parliamentary discourse, expressions of differences of opinion are strongly regulated¹⁷. As for the EP, for instance, in their research on the institutional preconditions for

¹¹ Hanks P. Definition // *The Oxford Handbook of Lexicography*. Oxford, 2016. P. 122.

¹² Hawke A. Quotation evidence and definitions // *The Oxford Handbook of Lexicography*. Oxford, 2016. P. 178.

¹³ Eemeren F. H., van, Henkemans A. F. S. *Argumentation*. P. 154.

¹⁴ Bayley P. Introduction: The whys and wherefores of analysing parliamentary discourse // *Cross-Cultural Perspectives on Parliamentary Discourse*. Amsterdam; Philadelphia, 2004. P. 1.

¹⁵ Hitchcock D. *On Reasoning and Argument: Essays in Informal Logic and on Critical Thinking*. Cham, 2017. P. 313.

¹⁶ *Ibid.* P. 313–314.

¹⁷ Eemeren F. H., van. *Argumentative patterns viewed from a pragma-dialectical perspective // Prototypical argumentative patterns*. Amsterdam; Philadelphia, 2017. P. 18.

strategic manoeuvring in legislative debate in the EP, van Eemeren and Garssen¹⁸ show that the debates conducted in the EP are highly regulated: there is a fixed speaking order and not many deviations by interruption, which makes the EP discourse strongly structured. However, as regards the types of argumentation that MEPs can use, there are not many restrictions, in other words, no special constraints apply to the argument schemes¹⁹ that can be used in the argumentation stage.

It has already been mentioned that argumentation in the EP is characterised by the so-called “European predicament”, which is an illustration of a *secondary* institutional precondition. As Proksch and Slapin²⁰ put it, MEPs are both members of national parties and members of European political groups in parliament, and, therefore, unlike Members of Parliaments in national parliaments, MEPs must respond to both national and European parties. Also, MEPs are less concentrated on the issues of the general public because of “the second-order nature of EP elections”, or “second-order national contests”²¹. Hix and Marsh²² highlight that European elections are referred to as “second-order” because they are secondary to the national elections, i. e., they are “national” elections rather than “European” elections. This means that the first motivation of politicians is to win national government office. All other elections, such as European elections, regional elections, or local elections are secondary to these “first-order” contests, which, eventually, leads to two consequences. The first consequence is a lower number of voters in European elections. The second consequence is that voters can use the EP elections to influence national elections or policies of the government despite the fact that the EP elections do not directly influence the formation of the national government. Finally, all this suggests the issue of divided loyalties in the EP. As the EP, together with the Commission, the Council, and the Court of Justice forms “the basic institutional quartet”²³, a more sophisticated understanding of the meaning of *loyalty* in the EP discourse can be acquired if a historical background to the formation of the EP and the EU is provided.

The European Parliament: A brief historical review

The Common Assembly of the European Coal and Steel Community. This brief historical review is based on El-Agraa’s²⁴ and Kreppel’s²⁵ studies of the EP and the EU. It

¹⁸ Eemeren F. H., van, Garssen B. In *varietate concordia* — United in diversity: European parliamentary debate as an argumentative activity type. *Controversia*. 2010. No. 7 (1). P. 30. — Cited in: Garssen B. The role of pragmatic problem-solving argumentation in plenary debate in the European Parliament // *Prototypical argumentative patterns*. Amsterdam; Philadelphia, 2017. P. 31–32.

¹⁹ Argument schemes can be classified in different ways. For more detail, see: Garssen B. *Argument Schemes // Crucial Concepts in Argumentation Theory*. Amsterdam, 2001. P. 81–99.

²⁰ Proksch S.-O., Slapin J. B. *The Politics of Parliamentary Debate: Parties, Rebels, and Representation*. Cambridge, 2015. P. 148.

²¹ Reif K., Schmitt H. Nine Second-Order National Elections: A Conceptual Framework for the Analysis of European Election Results. *European Journal of Political Research*. 1980. No. 8 (1). P. 3–45; Choosing Europe? The European Electorate and National Politics in the Face of Union / eds C. van der Eijk, M. Franklin. Ann Arbor, 1996. — Cited in: Hix S., Marsh M. Punishment or Protest? Understanding European Parliament Elections // *The Journal of Politics*. 2007. Vol. 69 (2). P. 495–496.

²² Hix S., Marsh M. Punishment or Protest? P. 495–496.

²³ Hix S. *The Political System of the European Union*. P. 3.

²⁴ El-Agraa A. M. *EU Institutions // The European Union: Economics and Policies*. Cambridge, 2011. P. 38–55.

²⁵ Kreppel A. *The European Parliament and Supranational Party System*. Cambridge, 2001.

encompasses the period between the formation of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) in 1951 and the Lisbon Treaty in 2009. To start with, after World War II, there were many “federalist” organisations in Europe, however, many attempts to create pan-European organisations were unsuccessful²⁶. To elaborate, another attempt was the European Coal and Steel Community, which can be regarded as a solution to the conflict between France and Germany over the Saar and Ruhr regions. In 1950, German Chancellor Konrad Adenauer proposed a type of cooperation between France and Germany similar to that of the unsuccessful 1940 Anglo-French Union. Even though the idea was not approved, Jean Monnet, Commissioner for the first French “National Plan”, suggested to Robert Schuman, the Foreign Minister of France, a plan to unite coal and steel industries of France and Germany under an independent authority. Although the plan initially included Britain, Britain retreated from the negotiations that consequently led to the formation of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC). Apart from France and Germany, the Community also included Italy, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg. It was ratified in 1951 and came to existence in 1952.

The Community was controlled by the “High Authority”. The High Authority was a supranational institution which significantly controlled the production and distribution of coal and steel. In order to achieve the balance of power, a nationally oriented Council of Ministers was established as well as a High Court, which adjudicated in the event of disputes. Also, the Common Assembly of the ECSC consisting of members selected from national parliaments was introduced so as to ensure public acceptance of the Community. Some of the most important characteristics of The Common Assembly were the following:

- 1) it had limited supervisory power;
- 2) it had no direct legislative authority; in fact, other international assemblies, which also existed when the Common Assembly was established, were not legislative institutions;
- 3) it was politically weak in comparison with the High Authority and the Council.

At the time the Common Assembly was founded, other international assemblies were organised according to national rather than ideological inclinations. However, the European Parliament (the European Parliamentary Assembly of the European Economic Community and Euratom), which later replaced the Common Assembly, was transformed over the course of time in two major ways. Firstly, political party groups were created, and, secondly, the EP slowly gained independent, legislative power. The former happened almost instantaneously, and the latter took thirty years, but the two events transformed the EP from a consultative into a legislative body.

The European Parliamentary Assembly of the European Economic Community and Euratom. Another integration happened in 1955, when the “Benelux Memorandum” initiated by Belgium, The Netherlands, and Luxembourg was created²⁷. As it will be further elaborated, it was an invitation to the other countries of the Coal and Steel Community to unite by expanding supranational integration. The integration meant cooperation in the fields of energy, social policy, and economy. The six Member States of the ECSC adopted two new treaties: one meant the creation of an internal free market — the EEC Treaty, and the other — the development and peaceful usage of atomic energy in Europe — the Eura-

²⁶ Ibid. P. 52–55.

²⁷ Ibid. P. 56–59.

tom Treaty. In 1957, the Member States signed these Treaties and, in that way, founded the European Economic Community and Euratom.

As regards the High Authority, it was still a very powerful supranational institution, i. e., it officially continued to control the Coal and Steel Community. However, a supranational Commission was established for each of the new Communities. These Commissions were less independent than the High Authority. As for the parliament and court, it was decided to establish a single Assembly and a single European Court of Justice for the three communities, which meant that the Common Assembly of the Coal and Steel Community did not exist anymore, and, instead, a new “European Parliamentary Assembly” was founded.

One of the differences between the Common Assembly and the EP was that the Treaties required that the Members of the EP should be elected directly, which was not the case with the Common Assembly, where the Members of the Common Assembly could, but did not have to be elected directly. Next, the new EP had more political authority in the sense that its power of censure was no longer limited to the annual report, i. e., the EP could censure the executive over any issue. Moreover, both Treaties formally included the EP in the legislative process by means of a consultation procedure. However, despite the changes and the idealistic goal to create a European Parliament similar to the national parliaments of the Member States, the power of the EP was small in comparison the powers of the Council and Commission.

As far as the political groups in the EP are concerned, Kreppel²⁸ notes the following. In 1970, at the time when her analysis began, the EP had 142 Members from six Member States: Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, and The Netherlands. Members were elected by their national legislatures, which meant that all MEPs had a dual mandate. The EP had a Bureau consisting of a president and eight vice presidents as well as the political group chairs, and it was decided from the beginning “that MEPs would sit according to ideological affinity, not nationality, as was the case in the other transnational assemblies of the time”, however, national identity could not be ignored²⁹. There were four political groups in 1970: the Christian Democratic Group, the Liberal Group, the Socialist Group, and the European Democratic Alliance.

The Budget Act, the beginning of direct elections and the Single European Act. The Council’s adoption of the Budget Act in 1970 and its implementation in 1975 was one of the major events in the development of the EP. The Budget Act meant more control over budgetary issues: additional rules and amendments were adopted that also gave the Parliament the power of discharge and added a “conciliation procedure”³⁰. Moreover, the revised Budget Act added the requirement that the President of the Parliament sign the budget so it could be officially adopted.

The second major event was the decision to introduce direct elections for MEPs. The decision was made in 1976, and the first elections were organised in 1979. Kreppel³¹ highlights that the introduction of direct elections was important because it transformed political authority with regard to other Community bodies. In comparison with the EP, the Commission was an appointed body with no direct connection to the citizens of Europe,

²⁸ Kreppel A. The European Parliament and Supranational Party System. P.95.

²⁹ Ibid.

³⁰ Ibid. P.66–67.

³¹ Ibid. P.71–72.

and, likewise, Council members were responsible to their national parliaments, not to the electorate. This meant that the EP was the only institution that was directly responsible to the citizens of Europe, and that the direct election represented people in terms of ideological affinities. Finally, the Court of Justice recognized this unique aspect of the EP in the 1980 ruling.

The third important event in the 1970s was the expansion of the EU: in 1973, the UK, Ireland, and Denmark became part of the EU, and the number of MEPs increased to 198. Kreppel³² argues that British entry may have been the most difficult. It was not approved by many of its people, and even though the United Kingdom became part of the EU, an exceptional national referendum was organised to decide whether the United Kingdom would remain within the Community. Moreover, the British entry was re-negotiated, and special arrangements for British trade with the Commonwealth were made. Apart from the United Kingdom, Ireland and Denmark, Greece became member of the Community in 1981, and Portugal and Spain joined the Community in 1986.

The Single European Act (SEA) was signed in 1986 and implemented in 1987. The SEA was the first official document which recognized the European Parliament's chosen name³³. Also, this document gave the Parliament the power of veto over the accession and association of new members. The EP's power also increased in the sense that the cooperation procedure for some legislative topics was added, which meant that the EP had the power to amend legislation directly. However, this did not mean that the EP had independent legislative authority because the cooperation procedure required the Commission's approval.

The Maastricht, Amsterdam and Nice Treaties. It was not before the implementation of the SEA and the Maastricht Treaty that the EP gained significant legislative powers³⁴. The Maastricht Treaty was signed in 1991, ratified in 1992, and implemented in 1993. The Treaty supplanted the European Communities and created a new 'European Union' in the sense that it pursued integration in domains of politics, defence, and economy³⁵. Specifically, the concept of a European citizenry and the need for European political parties were recognised. In addition, deadlines for a European Monetary Union and a single currency were agreed.

As regards the EP, the Maastricht Treaty added the co-decision procedure, by means of which the EP was granted absolute veto power in some fields of legislation. This meant that the power of the Commission was decreased because the cooperation between the EP and the Council increased. This was also the period when the EU expanded again. In 1990, due to German reunification increased, the membership of the EP increased: in 1995, Austria, Finland, and Sweden joined the EU, and the number of MEPs rose to 626³⁶.

The Amsterdam Treaty was adopted in 1997 and ratified in 1999 as a result of the issues relative to the expansion of the EU³⁷. The Treaty increased the powers of the EP. At this point, the equality of the EP and Council in conciliation was achieved. The Treaty also brought the limitation of the EP to 700 MEPs. To conclude, in the period that followed

³² Ibid. P. 67–68

³³ Ibid. P. 77–79.

³⁴ Ibid. P. 116.

³⁵ Ibid. P. 82–85.

³⁶ Ibid. P. 86.

³⁷ Ibid. P. 87–89.

the first major increase in legislative powers granted by the Budget Act, the EP was transformed into a legislative body: MEPs were directly elected, and the EP had the power to delay, amend and veto legislation. However, despite all this, the EP was still weaker in the legislative framework of the EU. This meant that the development of the EP continued.

The Nice Treaty was signed in 2001. The main focus of the Nice Treaty was the expansion of the EU. In December 2002, it was agreed that the following new states should join the EU: Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia in 2004, and Bulgaria and Romania could join in 2007, and all this came true³⁸. The last country to have entered the EU was Croatia in 2013. Following the referendum in 2016, the United Kingdom exited the European Union.

The Lisbon Treaty. The Lisbon Treaty was signed in 2007, but it became operative in 2009³⁹. As it will be pointed out, most of the Lisbon Treaty (Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, TFEU) integrates the previous treaties:

- 1) it is a single simplified EU treaty;
- 2) it introduces the post of the president of the EU Council;
- 3) it introduces the post of EU foreign policy chief, officially known as the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (the foreign policy supremo, FPS);
- 4) it provides more defence cooperation among the Member States;
- 5) it gives more power to the EP over legislation and the budget;
- 6) it allows national parliaments to prevent the EU law from violating the rights of the Member States;
- 7) it eliminates the national veto in some domains, such as immigration and asylum;
- 8) it preserves the national veto on tax, defence and foreign policy as well as financing the EU budget;
- 9) it adopts a new “double majority” voting system for the Council, which requires at least 15 Member States, which encompasses 65 percent of the EU population;
- 10) it adopts a mechanism for leaving the EU;
- 11) it increases the power of the so-called “eurogroup” — the countries which use the euro — to decide on their own policies;
- 12) it integrates the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights;
- 13) it reduces the size of the Commission, from the year 2014;
- 14) it increases the minimum number of seats in the EP for small Member States from four to six, and adopts the maximum number of ninety-six for the big Member States.

As regards the functioning of the EP, El-Agraa⁴⁰ highlights three important features that it shares with the Council. It legislates, it shares authority on the EU budget, and it both elects the president of the Commission and approves the nominations of the EU president and commissioners. In addition to this shared authority, it has an autonomous right to censure the Commission and to enforce its resignation, and, finally, it has the power of political supervision over all the institutions.

³⁸ *El-Agraa A. M.* EU Institutions. P. 32–33.

³⁹ *Ibid.* P. 34, 38.

⁴⁰ *Ibid.* P. 47.

Analysis

This section presents the results of the corpus analysis. The research included 50 instances of the word *loyalty* taken from *European Parliament Proceedings Parallel Corpus 1996–2011*, accessed through concordances by means of the web-based tool for corpus analysis *CQPweb* — *Lancaster University*. *CQPweb* allowed full access to *Europarl3: English*⁴¹. The corpus has 658 texts, 39,431,862 total number of word tokens, and 111,294 word types⁴².

Methods and data. The research is based on the evidence of quotations. The concordance/text codes provided by *CQPweb* can be used to search and check the examples in the *European Parliament Proceedings Parallel Corpus 1996–2011* and to identify the speakers' surnames. The 50 examples included in the analysis are the first fifty concordances/texts, which date from the period between 1996 and 2000. The concordances 42 (ep_98_11_19), 43 (ep_98_11_19), 44 (ep_98_11_19), and 45 (ep_98_11_19) are the same, therefore, the concordances 43, 44 and 45 have been replaced with the concordances 51 (ep_99_12_14), 52 (ep_99_12_15), and 53 (ep_00_03_02).

The table below summarises the results of the corpus analysis. Six meanings of the word *loyalty* were identified in accordance with the co-text given in the corpus and with the historical context of the development of the European Parliament. The meanings are listed from the most to the least frequent.

The word *loyalty* in different contexts

No.	<i>Loyalty</i> in different contexts	Concordance and text codes
1	INTRA- AND INTERINSTITUTIONAL LOYALTY (fifteen examples)	ep_96_12_12; ep_97_02_19; ep_97_03_11; ep_97_11_06; ep_97_12_16; ep_97_12_18; ep_98_02_16 (<i>five examples</i>); ep_98_04_01; ep_98_10_21; ep_98_11_19 (<i>two examples</i>)
2	LOYALTY TO THE EU (nine examples)	ep_96_07_03; ep_97_02_18; ep_97_04_23; ep_97_06_10; ep_97_07_15; ep_97_10_20; ep_97_11_20; ep_98_01_28; ep_99_09_15
3	LOYALTY AND ECONOMY (nine examples)	ep_97_09_18; ep_98_01_14 (<i>five examples</i>); ep_98_07_16; ep_98_10_09; ep_00_03_02
4	LOYALTIES TO THE EU AND THE HOME COUNTRY (six examples)	ep_96_06_19; ep_97_01_29; ep_97_06_26; ep_98_05_28; ep_99_04_15; ep_99_12_14
5	LOYALTY AS A COHESIVE INFLUENCE (six examples)	ep_97_06_12; ep_97_10_22 (<i>two examples</i>); ep_99_01_11; ep_99_04_14; ep_99_07_20
6	LOYALTY AND GLOBAL POLITICS (five examples)	ep_98_02_18 (<i>two examples</i>); ep_98_10_08; ep_98_11_17; ep_99_12_15

⁴¹ More information about this corpus can be found at: Available at: <http://opus.lingfil.uu.se/Europarl3.php> (accessed: 09.07.2023). — The website provides another link (Available at: <http://www.statmt.org/europarl/> (accessed: 09.07.2023)), which leads to “European Parliament Proceedings Parallel Corpus 1996–2011”.

⁴² See also: *Tiedemann J.* Parallel data, tools and interfaces in OPUS // Proceedings of the 8th International Conference on Language Resources and Evaluation (LREC 2012). [S.l.], 2012. P.2214–2218.

The next subsection provides illustrations of the six different meanings of the word *loyalty*. The word *loyalty* in the illustrative extracts is highlighted in bold type.

Intra- and interinstitutional loyalty. There are fifteen quotations of the word *loyalty* which are related to the EU intra- and interinstitutional issues. The degree of institutional complexity in the EU is much bigger than in any other international regime⁴³, and the analysis shows that *loyalty* and the institutional complexity is discussed in the EP more frequently than any other type of *loyalty*. The first illustration (ep_97_02_19) is related to the European Commission's 1996 ban on British exports of beef, which was followed by the United Kingdom's policy of non-cooperation, i. e., by the United Kingdom's blocking the EU decisions and legislation⁴⁴. Ms. Hautala criticises the Commission's requirement of *loyalty* from independent experts:

- (1) (...) It has just emerged that the Commission is requiring independent researchers and experts to give a written assurance that if the Commission sends them to discuss EMU at various events organized by citizens, the experts should undertake to speak only in accordance with the Commission's line. Thinking of the current BSE debate, Commissioner, how can we continue to trust the experts sent by the Commission if this kind of thing is going on? I have tabled a question about this, and I should like to know in what other connections the Commission requires such promises of ***loyalty*** from independent experts.

This speech shows that the Commission acted as an independent institution and required 'loyalty from independent experts'.

In the quotation 2 (ep_97_12_18), it can be seen that Mr. Fischbach argues that a good budget is the result of mutual understanding between two institutions. *Loyalty* is defined with regard to interinstitutional cooperation:

- (2) (...) It is a good budget because it is the result of a good understanding, of mutual understanding between the two authorities, the two branches of the budgetary authority, but also and more importantly the result of close cooperation, based on mutual trust between the Council and Parliament, and today's result has been achieved, Mr President, essentially thanks to Parliament, its Committee on Budgets, the chairman of that Committee and the two rapporteurs, Mr Tillich and Mr. Tomlinson, whose commitment, enthusiasm and ***loyalty*** I have appreciated throughout this budgetary procedure. (...)

Loyalty to the EU. There are nine extracts which show that *loyalty* can be defined as *loyalty* to the European Union's interests. The following quotation (ep_97_02_18) illustrates this. The speaker is Mr. Martens, then President of the European People's Party:

- (3) (...) The report identifies the UK Government as the body mainly responsible for the BSE crisis and it points to six occasions when successive governments

⁴³ Hix S. The Political System of the European Union. P.3.

⁴⁴ See also two newspaper articles: *Buerkle T.* Veterinary Experts Approve Plan to Widen Slaughter of Cattle: Britain's Concession Wins EU Backing // The New York Times. 1996. June 20; BSE crisis: timeline // The Guardian. 2000. October 26. Available at: <https://www.theguardian.com/uk/2000/oct/26/bse3> (accessed: 09.07.2023).

violated Article 5 of the Treaty and refused to obey the rules of fair and transparent cooperation.

As you know, Article 5 of the Treaty sets out the principle of *loyalty* to the Community.

However, the Council is also to blame for the passivity and delays in fighting the epidemic in the UK, for taking wrong decisions and providing poor coordination in protecting public health, and for the disinformation of the public. (...)

Example 3 is connected with example 1, i. e., it is a discussion of the European Commission's 1996 ban on British exports of beef. As mentioned in the historical review, British entry to the EU may have been the most difficult, and considering the fact that the UK exited the EU, it can be concluded that disagreements between the UK and the EU could generally be expected. The following example, the quotation 4 (ep_97_06_10) taken from Mr. Liikanen's speech is about ensuring staff loyalty:

- (4) (...) The Commission is aware of the fact that the European Foundation in Dublin has not applied age limits in its vacancy notices for several years. The practice of applying age limits has its origins in the very concept of a permanent and independent European civil service, along the lines of practices pursued, still today, in the diplomatic services of most Member States and by a certain number of other administrations. The aim is to recruit young members of staff, offering them long term career prospects, in order to ensure a certain continuity in the services and staff *loyalty*. In the institutions, this policy seems to have worked and achieved its aims. (...)

Loyalty and economy. This group also has nine quotations. It is undeniable that loyalty is defined in relation to economy because economic integration is an essential component of the EU, from its beginnings. As stated, the 1995 "Benelux Memorandum" was an invitation to unite by expanding supranational integration, which meant cooperation in the fields of energy, social policy, and economy, the creation of an international free market, and the usage of atomic energy. Examples 5 and 6 (both from the text ep_98_01_14) demonstrate the connection between *loyalty* and economic issues. The speaker is Mr. Sainjon:

- (5) (...) Furthermore, questions arise concerning the countries which will not join the single currency on 1st January 1999. Mr. President, in actual fact the report is in contrast with protectionist theories and it defends a strong idea: that of more *loyalty* within the context of globalization, as an answer to certain relocations. The conquest of new markets is an imperative for business, and investment is necessary to accompany this strategy. (...)
- (6) (...) It is thus not a matter of rejecting what I would call offensive relocations. On the contrary, it is a matter of seeing how some uncontrolled relocations, whose aim is not to conquer a market but to bring about subcontracting, which very often leads to greater exploitation of the workforce and massive cut in jobs within Europe, can be avoided.

Loyalty should therefore be the rule for all, starting with the European Union. (...)

Economic development was part of the development of the EU institutions. This development became even more complex because the more the EU institutions gained the powers of government, the more groups (such as individual corporations, business organisations, trade unions, political parties, etc.) attempted to promote and protect their interests⁴⁵.

Loyalties to the EU and the home country. Example 7 (ep_96_06_19) is related to examples 1 and 3. Here, the United Kingdom's "attitude of non-cooperation" is criticised. It is seen as regrettable for the reason that it "breaks the duty of loyalty under Article 5 of the Treaty". The speaker is Mr. Dini, then President of the European Council:

- (7) (...) The third consideration is that the United Kingdom's attitude of non-cooperation taken by the United Kingdom is extremely regrettable because it breaks the duty of **loyalty** under Article 5 of the Treaty, whereby Member States "shall abstain from any measure which could jeopardize the attainment of the objectives of this Treaty". (...)

Text 8 (ep_97_06_26) is another instance of the use of the word *loyalty* with reference to the issue of divided loyalties to the EU and the home country. Mr. Valverde López expresses concern that some governments do not adhere to the principle of institutional loyalty:

- (8) (...) One further cause for concern is the steps taken by some governments which have recently come to power and have not followed the principle of institutional **loyalty** which should oblige governments to adhere to agreements already signed. (...)

Loyalty as a cohesive influence. Six quotations in the corpus show that *loyalty* can be defined as a cohesive power, in addition to solidarity, friendship, cooperation, tolerance, fair play, etc. The following statement (ep_97_10_22) was given by Mr. Hory:

- (9) (...) Is our European Union a supermarket, where the only law is maximizing profit at least production cost?
Or is it a political construction, based on values of solidarity, quality, and **loyalty**?
(...)
Our drive towards integration must, in the minds of European citizens, be seen as consistent with a constant improvement, and not as downgrading of their quality of life. (...)

Extract 10 (ep_99_04_14) is another quotation where *loyalty* is defined as a cohesive power. The speaker is Mr. Donner:

- (10) (...) Sooner or later — sooner better than later — the country should be capable of solving its minority problems and creating a society where all people, regardless

⁴⁵ Hix S. The Political System of the European Union. P. 3.

of the language they speak, subscribe loyally to the principles of democracy and the rule of law.

Loyalty is not built on citizenship alone, but also on common values. (...)

Loyalty and global politics. The last group has five texts where *loyalty* is discussed in connection with global political relations. The following speech (ep_98_02_18) was given by Mr. Sakellariou:

- (11) (...) Mr. President of the Council, in recent weeks I have admired the determination with which your government has demonstrated its solidarity and **loyalty** towards the USA. (...)
This strengthens me in my hope and desire that the other 14 members of the European Union will soon be able to count on this same solidarity and loyalty.

Finally, quotation 12 (ep_98_11_17) was extracted from Mr. Herzog's speech:

- (12) (...) We need a more autonomous and unified European Union and we would ask our American partners to show more **loyalty** towards the commitments they have made. The United States is renewing commercial tensions and is not respecting the London commitment on extraterritorial laws. (...)

These examples show that the relation between the EU and world politics is also discussed in the EP. This suggests that, in addition to internal issues, the EU is faced with global political challenges⁴⁶.

Conclusion

This analysis of the meaning of *loyalty* in the EP discourse included 50 quotations where the word *loyalty* was mentioned. The results show that the co-text can be used to define the meaning of *loyalty*, however, co-text has its limitations because evidence-based definitions of meaning may not always suffice. This means that it is only through the historical contextualisation that a more nuanced understanding of different meanings of *loyalty* can be achieved. In other words, without the historical contextualisation of the meaning of *loyalty* in the EP discourse, it may not be possible to understand or analyse which aspects of the meaning potential were activated. It may not be possible to be aware of possible implications, continuity, and coherence in international and interinstitutional relations, as well as possible causes of conflicts and challenges, which, with a proper historical knowledge and awareness, can be predicted.

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⁴⁶ See the conclusions about the EU integration provided by: *El-Agraa A. M.* EU Institutions. P. 53.

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