

# The Moscow Embassy of George Kennan and American Diplomacy in the Cold War

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This paper studies the operations of the Embassy of the United States of America in Moscow headed by G. F. Kennan (May — September 1952) in the context of Cold War diplomatic history. Based on an analysis of documents located in the Archive of the Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation, this study focuses on such key international issues as peaceful settlement of the Korean war, resolution of the German issue, and the signing of a treaty protecting fur seals in the Pacific basin. This article highlights the role of the American Embassy in Moscow, and of Ambassador Kennan in particular, in the discussion of these issues, and the nature of the embassy staff members' interactions with Soviet authorities. The archival materials concerning the Soviet-American relations in 1952 provide clear evidence that the diplomatic corps faced severe difficulties under the conditions of military and political confrontation of the Cold War. The paper also elucidates the reasons for declaring Kennan *persona non grata*. Finally, the author considers the influence of the Moscow ambassadorship on Kennan's perception of communism and the Soviet social system. He became convinced not only of the Soviet political system's bureaucratic inertia and clumsiness, its excessive centralization, and its total focus on Stalin's personality, but also of the extreme straightforwardness and uncompromising nature of American foreign policy towards the Soviet Union.

*Keywords:* Cold War, American diplomacy, George Frost Kennan, Korean War, Stalin Note, North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Convention on Conservation of North Pacific Fur Seals.

## Московское посольство Джорджа Кеннана и американская дипломатия периода холодной войны

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Статья посвящена изучению деятельности американского посольства в Москве под руководством Джорджа Ф. Кеннана в мае — сентябре 1952 г. в контексте дипломатической истории периода холодной войны. На основе анализа документов Архива

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внешней политики Российской Федерации раскрываются перипетии советско-американского переговорного процесса по таким важным международным проблемам, как мирное урегулирование Корейской войны, решение германского вопроса, заключение конвенции о сохранении морских котиков в бассейне Тихого океана, и многим другим. Существенное внимание уделяется выявлению роли американского посольства в СССР и лично посла Кеннана в обсуждении этих вопросов и характеру взаимодействия сотрудников посольства США с советскими властями. Изученные архивные материалы позволяют сделать вывод о том, что в условиях идеологической и военно-политической конфронтации времен холодной войны американские дипломаты, находящиеся в Москве, были лишь посредниками в передаче информации, мало влиявшими на характер развития советско-американских отношений. В статье также рассматриваются причины и обстоятельства признания американского посла персоной нон грата в Советском Союзе. Для Кеннана это событие стало профессиональным поражением, заставившим покинуть дипломатическую службу и сосредоточиться на научной деятельности в Принстонском институте перспективных исследований. Опыт дипломатической деятельности в Москве существенно повлиял на восприятие Кеннаном коммунизма и советской общественной системы. Инертность, забюрократизированность, идеологический догматизм, чрезмерная централизация власти — ключевые признаки советской политической системы, отмеченные американским дипломатом. Однако и американская политика в отношении Советского Союза в послевоенное время трактовалась Кеннаном как крайне прямолинейная, бескомпромиссная, слабо подверженная стратегическому планированию.

*Ключевые слова:* холодная война, американская дипломатия, Джордж Фрост Кеннан, Корейская война, нота Сталина, НАТО, конвенция о сохранении котиков северной части Тихого океана.

By 1952, the Soviet-American relationship had entered a confrontational stage and then deteriorated further due to the Korean War and the issue of the partition of Germany. Under such circumstances, the role of diplomats significantly increased as they were frequently the only people who could find common ground among the opposing sides during the process of international conflict resolution. Undoubtedly, George Kennan, who headed the American Embassy upon his arrival in the USSR in May 1952, was one of the diplomats geared towards the preservation and maintenance of peace.

Kennan's name is traditionally associated with the "containment doctrine" formulated in his "Long Telegram" (February 1946) and his article entitled "The Sources of Soviet Conduct" (July 1947), which evolved as a result of extensive studies of communism and the Soviet system. During the period 1933–1937 Kennan held the post of Third Secretary of the American Embassy in Moscow. In 1944–1946, he served there as an advisor to Ambassador Averell W. Harriman. In the years 1947–1950, Kennan was the director of the Department of State's Policy Planning Staff, dealing closely with the development and implementation of US foreign policy towards the USSR. Following his retirement in August 1950, Kennan began an academic career at The Institute for Advanced Study in Princeton, tying his scientific research with studies of Russian history and culture. By 1952, he had become the chief American Sovietologist.

Kennan's life and work have been researched in dozens of biographical studies, yet his stay in Moscow remains under-investigated<sup>1</sup>. This is partly related to the fact that Kennan,

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<sup>1</sup> Gaddis J.L. George F. Kennan: An American Life. New York, 2011; Gellman B. Contending with Kennan: Toward a Philosophy of American Power. New York, 1984; Harper J.L. American Visions of

who was declared *persona non grata* in Moscow and had placed the Soviet-American diplomatic relations on the brink of cessation, did not like to recall his stay in Moscow and considered it a professional failure<sup>2</sup>. Such a situation had arisen partly due to the fact that no significant agreements have been reached in the months of Kennan's ambassadorship. When compared to other episodes of Kennan's long and eventful life, the Moscow ambassadorship may appear to be a fleeting occurrence, but in fact it was not: it heavily influenced his perception of communism and the Soviet state.

The most significant documents related to the operations of the American Embassy in Moscow have been stored in the Archive of the Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation (Fond 07 "Documents of the secretariat of the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the USSR A. Y. Vyshinski" and Fond 0129 "Administrative materials on the USA"). Researching these documents allows to fill the historiographic gaps related to Kennan's ambassadorship and the operations of the US Embassy in the USSR in 1952.

On December 1, 1951, H. S. Cumming, Jr., the temporary USA Charge d'Affaires in the USSR, reported to Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs A. A. Gromyko that Kennan was prospective candidate for ambassadorship under President Truman and expressed a desire to know the Soviet opinion on the acceptability of his candidacy<sup>3</sup>. The US diplomat presented Kennan's curriculum vitae that contained only a list of the places of his diplomatic service. Kennan's appointment did not prompt any official protests on the part of the Soviet authorities. It was in fact the American establishment that mounted opposition to Kennan. This hostility was caused by the apparent diversion between Kennan's opinion and the position of official Washington on the issues of Soviet policy, and the best account of this conflict is the publication of Kennan's lectures delivered at the University of Chicago in April 1951, which contained sharp criticism of the US foreign policy of the time<sup>4</sup>. First of all, Kennan criticized the moralistic approach to solving international problems, which was typical of the US foreign policy. Kennan's nomination was only endorsed on March 13, 1952, by the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, and by the President on the following day<sup>5</sup>.

For his part, Kennan felt a responsibility for the evolution of the Soviet-American relations, and after certain doubts he agreed to become head of the Embassy. In the second volume of his memoirs (1972) Kennan writes: "...it was especially hard for me to turn down an assignment as ambassador to the Soviet Union — a task for which my whole career had prepared me, if it had prepared me for anything at all"<sup>6</sup>. Inquisitiveness, a special

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Europe. Franklin D. Roosevelt, George F. Kennan, and Dean G. Acheson. Cambridge, 1997; *Hixson W.L.* George F. Kennan: Cold War Iconoclast. New York, 1989; *Lukacs J.* George Kennan. A Study of Character. New Haven, 2007; *Mayers D.* George Kennan and the Dilemmas of U.S. Foreign Policy. New York, 1988; *Miscamble W.D.* G. F. Kennan and the Making of American Foreign Policy, 1947–1950. Princeton, 1992; *Polley M.* A Biography of George F. Kennan: The Education of a Realist. Lewiston, 1990; *Stephanson A.* Kennan and the Art of Foreign Policy. Cambridge, 1989.

<sup>2</sup> *Kennan G. F.* Memoirs, 1950–1963. Boston, 1972. P. 166–167.

<sup>3</sup> *Zapis' besedy zamestitelia ministra inostrannykh del SSSR A. A. Gromyko s vremennym poverennym v delah SSHA v SSSR H. S. Kammingom otnositel'no namereniia prezidenta SSHA Trumana naznachit' G. Kennana poslom SSHA v SSSR. 1 dekabria 1951 g. // Sovetsko-amerikanskie otnosheniia. 1949–1952 / ed. by G. N. Sevost'ianova. Moscow, 2006. P. 487.*

<sup>4</sup> *Kennan G. F.* American Diplomacy, 1900–1950. Chicago, 1951.

<sup>5</sup> No. 496 Editorial Note // Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS). 1952–1954. Vol. VIII: Eastern Europe, Soviet Union, Eastern Mediterranean. Washington, 1988. P. 967.

<sup>6</sup> *Kennan G. F.* Memoirs, 1950–1963. P. 106.

interest in Russia, and the desire to see the changes that occurred there in the post-war period may have also contributed to his decision. Besides, despite his extensive diplomatic experience, Kennan had never officially been an ambassador, and he was curious to try himself out in this new capacity.

Prior to Kennan's departure for Moscow, he met with President Truman. Nonetheless, Kennan did not receive any kind of official instructions<sup>7</sup>. Later Kennan recalled: "I became concerned to realize that I had had absolutely no real instructions of any sort either from the Secretary of State or from President, or even any proper guidance as to their attitude with respect to the acute problems of the moment, such as Germany, the Korean armistice talks, the disarmament discussions in the United Nations, etc."<sup>8</sup>. Kennan assumed that the American leaders had demonstrated a disdain for the Moscow mission, considering it futile<sup>9</sup>. Archival materials confirm that Kennan was correct.

On April 12, 1952, the deputy director of the United States Department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, V.I. Basykin, wrote an internal memorandum to deputy minister A.A. Gromyko regarding a request that came from the US embassy to allow an American plane to fly over the Soviet territory with the US ambassador on board. The note elaborated that such permits had been granted by the Soviet side during the war as a favor to its anti-Hitler coalition allies, but in situations of Cold War the viability of ceasing to grant such permits was questioned<sup>10</sup>. The note was passed on to Minister of Foreign Affairs A.Y. Vyshinskii with A.A. Gromyko's comment "the initiative deserves attention, but is the new ambassador's flight scheduled for an appropriate time?"<sup>11</sup>. The timing was apparently considered inappropriate, and in a report to Joseph Stalin dated April 15, 1952, a proposal was made to allow the flight of the US plane with a Soviet co-pilot and a radio officer on board. The chief argument for allowing the flight was that the prohibition of the US plane's flight to Moscow might mean that "Americans may put pressure on the French and British governments and compel them to prohibit the flights of Soviet planes to Paris and London, and such flights are necessary due to the international conferences and General Assembly sessions held in the aforementioned capitals"<sup>12</sup>. Finally, the permission for the flight was granted by Stalin personally over the telephone, on the condition of the presence of a Soviet co-pilot and a radio officer aboard the plane<sup>13</sup>. All further flights of US planes with diplomatic personnel on board were approved at the very top level with a compulsory attachment of a list of all the crew members and passengers along with their passport information, and the presence of Soviet air force officers was mandatory.

On May 5, 1952, Kennan arrived in Moscow and was received by the Soviet leaders. At official meetings with Soviet Minister of Foreign Affairs A.Y. Vyshinskii and Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme USSR N.M. Shvernik both sides declared mutual aspirations for understanding and cooperation. However, in spite of the official reassurances of warm relations, in reality there was no proper communication between US Embassy staff

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<sup>7</sup> Kennan G.F. *Memoirs...* P.107.

<sup>8</sup> *Ibid.* P.108.

<sup>9</sup> *Ibid.* P.111.

<sup>10</sup> О разрешении на перелет самолета Кеннана // Архив внешней политики Российской Федерации (АВП РФ). Ф.07. Оп. 25. П.24. Д.296. Л. 6–7.

<sup>11</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>12</sup> *Ibid.* L. 8.

<sup>13</sup> *Ibid.* L. 10.

and Soviet leaders: Kennan had only personally met with Minister A. Y. Vyshinskii four times — May 10, June 19, July 10, and September 15, 1952 — and these meetings were never prolonged. Diplomatic correspondence was the main channel of communication between the US Embassy and Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs. This arrangement made any discussion of serious issues practically impossible. Kennan noted in his letter to president Truman in August 1952: “There simply is no real channel for any exchange of views; and while we maintain a big embassy here in the middle of Moscow, we are so cut off and hemmed in with restrictions and ignored by the Soviet Government that it is as though no diplomatic relations existed at all”<sup>14</sup>.

Curiously enough, Kennan never made an attempt to meet with Stalin to clarify the actual state of the relationship between the US and the USSR during his stay in Moscow. In an interview in 1979 with George Urban, a well-known British journalist of Hungarian descent, on the “Free Europe” radio station, Kennan attempted to elucidate his position on this issue: “I had nothing to say to Stalin on behalf of the United States government. Nor did I have... instructions which would have given me any idea what to say to him... I knew that my British colleagues [Sir Alvery] Gascoigne, had been kept waiting for an appointment, unsuccessfully, for seven or eight months; and I did not want to subject myself, and the United States government, to this humiliation. In retrospect, I may have made a mistake although I had no instructions to see Stalin”<sup>15</sup>.

The full isolation regime for foreigners in Moscow was an even greater annoyance to the ambassador. The suppression of any attempt to contact the local population, a prohibition on travel around the country, a continual escort by state security officers made diplomats feel as though they were under arrest. In his memoirs, Kennan remembers his “bodyguards” with irony: “Five of these accompanied me every time I left the premises. If my departure was by car, they swung into line behind me with a car of their own... If I left by foot, three of them paced along at my heels, and their own car, with the others, followed at a pedestrian pace. If I went swimming, as I did two or three times during the course of the ensuing summer, one of them was in the water, swimming amiably alongside, wherever my strokes took me. If I went to the theater, five unfortunate ticket-holders in the row just behind us were relentlessly displaced, and the ‘angels’ (as they were ironically called in the diplomatic corps) shared my enjoyment of the performance”<sup>16</sup>. He does, however, note that they did not express any personal dislike of him but proceeded with their duties in a disciplined manner. The regular requests to the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs for visas to be issued to embassy staff serve as indirect evidence of the existence of an isolation regime in regard to American diplomats. Prior to this time, Soviet citizens often served as cooks, drivers, maids at the embassy; now practically all of the staff was foreign. In particular, the Americans appealed to the Soviets on June 14, 1952, to grant visas to Danish citizens Karl Burkel Holm and his wife Andrea Kristine Staushol Simonsen, who were supposed to serve as an embassy steward and a cook<sup>17</sup>. On June 17 the same inquiry was submitted in regard to a Danish citizen Kirsten Gansted, who was hired as a maid to

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<sup>14</sup> The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Kennan) to the President. Moscow. August 11, 1952 // FRUS. 1952–1954. Vol. VIII. P. 1035.

<sup>15</sup> A Conversation. George F. Kennan and George Urban // Encounters with Kennan: The Great Debate. London, 1979. P. 41.

<sup>16</sup> Kennan G. F. Memoirs, 1950–1963. P. 113.

<sup>17</sup> Noty posolstva SShA v Moskve otdelu stran Ameriki // AVP RF. F. 0129. Op. 36. P. 253. D. 2. L. 117.

the ambassador's wife<sup>18</sup>. The situation was so complicated that in the course of his meeting with A. Y. Vyshinskii on September 15, 1952, the ambassador had to personally request permission for American Embassy staff members Toker and Atkins to marry Soviet women. Kennan particularly emphasized that in the case of departure to the USA, the wives of American diplomats should not publicly participate in politics<sup>19</sup>. The Soviet Minister's response was vague and evasive. This once again emphasized the difficulty in resolving even trivial issues.

Thus, the mode of isolating American diplomats in the USSR and their minimal contacts with the Soviet authorities significantly complicated the discussion of important political issues, preventing the embassy from becoming an influential subject in the Soviet-American negotiations. Essentially, American diplomats in Moscow were just "transmitters" of information, who had little impact on the nature of evolution of the relations between the two countries and dealt mostly with current diplomatic issues.

The main issue for Soviet-American relations during the year 1952 was the Korean War. Considering that between May and June 1951, Kennan participated in secret negotiations concerning Korea with the Soviet representative Iakov Malik<sup>20</sup>, it was logical to assume that the Ambassador had an opportunity to demonstrate his knowledge, but it did not turn out in this way. The Korean agenda was touched upon most often in connection with an "anti-American campaign" in the Soviet press, which centered mostly on the use of bacteriological weapons by the US in Korea and mistreatment of North Korean prisoners of war. This was a part of the agenda during Kennan's meeting with A. Y. Vyshinskii on June 19, 1952. According to the minutes of the meeting, Kennan declared his concern with anti-American propaganda in the USSR, which was "difficult to reconcile with the desire to improve the relations between the two countries", and which, on the contrary, impaired Soviet-American relations and placed him, as an Ambassador, in a grievous position<sup>21</sup>.

In his reports to the State Department, Kennan noted that the new flare of anti-Americanism differed from the well-known and already habitual Soviet propaganda not just in the degree of intensity and harshness of statements, but in its internal motivations. The Soviet authorities' chief motive in making a decision to begin the campaign was the desire to distract the citizens from the problems in the Soviet bloc and divert their attention onto international issues, although the desire to discredit the USA and Kennan personally was also a motive<sup>22</sup>. Based on Kennan's reports, during his meeting with the Soviet US ambassador, A. S. Paniushkin, Secretary of State Dean Acheson expressed his deep concern with the vicious anti-American campaign and did not exclude the possibility of lodging an official objection to the Soviet leadership in connection with it<sup>23</sup>. The report of the Soviet Embassy in the USA for the second quarter of 1952 emphasized that the anti-American campaign in the USSR was a lie concocted by Kennan personally, and this "buzz about the

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<sup>18</sup> Ibid. L. 124.

<sup>19</sup> Lichnye pis'ma t. Vyshinskogo A. Y. poslu SShA v SSSR i lichnye pis'ma posla SShA v SSSR na imia t. Vyshinskogo A. Y. // AVP RF. F.07. Op. 15. P.5. D.91. L. 72–74.

<sup>20</sup> Y Ben Y. Velikobritaniia, SSHA i SSSR na putiakh k peremiriiu v Koreiskoi voine (sekretnye peregovory derzhav) // Voina v Koree 1950–1953 gg.: vzgliad cherez 50 let. Moscow, 2001. P. 173–176.

<sup>21</sup> Lichnye pis'ma t. Vyshinskogo A. Y. ... L. 47–48.

<sup>22</sup> The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Kennan) to the Deputy Under Secretary of State (Matthews) // FRUS. 1952–1954. Vol. VIII. P.987–1000.

<sup>23</sup> Memorandum of Conversation, by the Secretary of State. June 6, 1952 // Ibid. P.986.

'hate propaganda' was necessary so that the US government could provide a basis for the rampant anti-Soviet hysteria and war propaganda in the USA"<sup>24</sup>. This never led to an official response from the Americans, but Kennan repeatedly pointed out the problem of the anti-American campaign to the Secretary of State in his reports, striving to elicit a more decisive reaction from Washington.

Research by the Russian historian N. I. Nikolaeva provides strong evidence that confirms the existence of an anti-American campaign in the Soviet press in connection with the Korean War. She notes that the Soviet newspapers depicted the war as an act of aggression by American imperialists aiming to deprive Korea of its national independence, turn it into a colony for American monopolies, and use it as a strategic military foothold in the Far East<sup>25</sup>. The situation resulted in the shutdown of the monthly *Amerika* magazine published by the US embassy in the USSR. In their address on July 14, 1952, the American diplomats informed the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the USSR of the cessation of magazine's publication due to the fact that the Soviet authorities "are tightening the limitations in regard to full distribution and free sale of the magazine... As a result of this hindrance, the number of issues actually reaching Soviet citizens is so meager that it does not justify the efforts of the Government of the United States in attempting to provide a realistic portrayal of life in America and thus promote mutual understanding between the two countries"<sup>26</sup>. The official address ended with a demand to stop the publication and distribution of the USSR Information Bulletin, which was published by the Soviet embassy, in the United States. In their response Soviet authorities emphatically denied all accusations against them and stressed that the "*Amerika*" magazine was distributed through the "Soiuzpechat" network, along with other publications, and the decreasing quantity of the distributed magazines only demonstrated that "the magazine had intensified the anti-Soviet propaganda, which naturally led to the fact that the "*Amerika*" magazine had lost its popularity with the Soviet readers"<sup>27</sup>. The demand to close down the USSR Information Bulletin was considered to be aimed at stopping the distribution of "true" views on the USSR in the United States. In spite of the protests, the Soviet embassy was forced to stop publishing the *Information Bulletin* although since 1956 a new social and political magazine, "*Sovetskii Soiuz*", published by the Pravda publishing house, had begun to be distributed under the new Soviet-American agreement, and, in turn, the publication and distribution of the "*Amerika*" magazine resumed in the USSR.

Another issue, also closely linked to the Korean problem, which was a subject of Soviet-American discussion, was related to the plight of prisoners of war. On July 23, 1952, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs received a note from Kennan regarding the non-adherence of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and the leaders of the Chinese People's Volunteer Army to the Geneva Convention regarding the Treatment of Prisoners of War. The document particularly emphasized that the following provisions of the convention were violated: "inspection of POW camps by a neutral international organization was not allowed (article 126), packages were not given to addressees (article 72), and the camps were

<sup>24</sup> Iz politicheskogo otcheta posol'stva SSSR v SSHA za II kvartal 1952 g. // Sovetsko-amerikanskije otnosheniia. 1949–1952 / ed. by G. N. Sevost'ianova. Moscow, 2006. P. 582–583.

<sup>25</sup> Nikolaeva N. I. Koreiskaia vojna i antiamerikanskaia propaganda v SSSR (po stranitsam periodicheskoi pečati) // Voenno-istoricheskie issledovaniia v Povolzh'e. Vol. 5. Saratov, 2003. P. 255–261.

<sup>26</sup> Noty posol'stva SShA v Moskve otdelu stran Ameriki (tom 2 i poslednii) // AVP RF. F. 0129. Op. 36. P. 253. D. 3. L. 17.

<sup>27</sup> Noty otdela SShA posol'stvu SShA v Moskve // Ibid. D. 1. L. 86.

located close to military targets, which placed the prisoners of war in danger (article 23)”, with the conclusion containing a request to the Soviet government to influence North Korean and Chinese authorities in this issue<sup>28</sup>.

The official Soviet response was revised multiple times by the staff at the US department of the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs with the active participation of A. Y. Vyshinskii, and the final version was approved by Stalin personally. The first draft of the response was the least inclined to compromise and contained serious reciprocal accusations: “US armed forces are waging an aggressive war in Korea and systematically and gravely violating the principles of the Geneva Convention relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War. Obvious violations of this convention on the part of US military authorities in Korea... are the harsh treatment of the prisoners of war, forcing them to join the ranks of the enemy army, mass shootings of prisoners of war, etc.”<sup>29</sup>. Considering all of these facts, the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs did not deem it possible to satisfy the request of the US embassy, emphasizing: “The governments of the People’s Democratic Republic of Korea and People’s Republic of China fully adhere to the aforementioned Geneva convention, and therefore contacting them regarding the contents of the note would not be warranted”<sup>30</sup>. The second and third drafts of the letters were considerably more moderate although the emphasis was still placed on the adherence by the People’s Democratic Republic of Korea government and the Chinese People’s Volunteer Army to the Geneva convention provisions, and was followed by the refusal of the Soviet side to get involved<sup>31</sup>. The final draft of the document, signed by Stalin on July 29, 1952, stated: “The statement contained in the aforementioned note regarding the fact that the People’s Democratic Republic of Korea and the leaders of the Chinese People’s Volunteer Army supposedly don’t adhere to the Geneva Convention is ungrounded and is not supported by the evidence. However, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the USSR will out of courtesy inform the governments of the People’s Republic of China and Democratic People’s Republic of Korea of the request contained in your note dated on July 23”<sup>32</sup>. The Soviet position on interfering in the POW treatment issue had softened significantly, which could have been indirect evidence of the USSR’s vested interest in the speedy resolution of the Korean conflict.

In August 1952, an important issue concerned the possible visit of American mothers to see their POW children in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. For example, the ministry addressed a note to Stalin with the proposal to prohibit the visit of American mothers: “The US State Department may use such a visit with hostile and provocative goals against the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea”<sup>33</sup>. The final decision on this matter was postponed until the end of the 7<sup>th</sup> Session of the General Assembly of the United Nations, but even upon its completion the American mothers were not granted access to the POW camps located in Democratic People’s Republic of Korea.

Thus, the Korean issues in the correspondence between US Embassy and Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the USSR in the summer of 1952 was limited to the discussion of the

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<sup>28</sup> Politicheskie voprosy // AVP RF. F.07. Op. 25. P.23. D.285. L. 15.

<sup>29</sup> Ibid. L. 5.

<sup>30</sup> Ibid.

<sup>31</sup> Ibid. L. 9.

<sup>32</sup> Ibid. L. 15.

<sup>33</sup> Perepiska po politicheskim voprosam, kasaiushchimsia Korei // AVP RF. F.0129. Op.36. P.256. D.20. L. 7.

POW issue and the anti-American campaign in the Soviet press. The crucial questions concerning the formal resolution of military conflict and the degree of Soviet involvement were beyond the competence of Ambassador Kennan and the embassy staff.

In 1952, the situation in Germany remained equally complex. On March 10, 1952, the Soviet government addressed a note to the US, British, and French governments with a proposal to prepare and conclude a peace treaty with the unified German government, attaching a project entitled “The Basis for a Peace Treaty with Germany”. Historians offer various versions of Moscow’s peace proposals, ranging from a sincere desire of the Soviets to resolve the German issue to a cunning propaganda move to fool people into believing that the Soviets were acting fairly<sup>34</sup>. On March 25, 1952, the US response, which was coordinated with the French and British governments, declined the Soviet proposals. Western countries noted that the conclusion of a peace treaty with Germany must be precluded by free elections under the control of a special UN commission, Soviet occupation zone included, and expressed opposition to the ban for the future unified Germany to enter military and political alliances<sup>35</sup>. On April 9, 1952, the Soviet authorities once again emphasized that the unification of Germany was “adequate to the fair demands of the legitimate national interests of the German people”, admitted the necessity of holding prompt pan-German elections to under the control of the four victorious countries rather than the UN, and, finally, stated that a prohibiting Germany to join any military alliances and coalitions was not considered a hindrance to German sovereignty<sup>36</sup>.

The discussion of this Stalin Note continued in the summer of 1952 when Kennan presented the new American proposals on Germany to Minister A. Y. Vyshinskii during a meeting. As the ambassador presented the note, he emphasized that he was not authorized to make any comments or addenda on his part regarding the content of the document<sup>37</sup>. The essence of American proposals could be reduced to the idea that the conclusion of a peace treaty with Germany should be precluded by free and unbiased pan-German elections under the control of UN Commission instead of the Potsdam quadrilateral control system, which had exhausted itself<sup>38</sup>. The ideas contradicted the position of the Soviet side, which emphatically rejected the international inspection clause, and the resolution of the German problem in the summer of 1952 had apparently reached a deadlock. This “note battle” lasted until November. The creation of a unified and neutral Germany was practically impossible because neither side was ready for a compromise in order to satisfy the aspirations of the German people.

Kennan was involved to a much larger extent with another German-related issue, the discussion of the fate of the Soviet children who were kidnapped and taken to Germany and Austria during the war. According to the Soviets, by 1952 about two thousand minors remained in the Western occupation zones of Germany and Austria. Regardless of the fact that many of them had surviving parents, and their Soviet citizenship was officially confirmed, they were transported to the United States following a court decision. Certain

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<sup>34</sup> Rodovich Y. V. O note Stalina ot 10 marta 1952 g. po germanskomu voprosu // *Novaia i noveishaia istoriia*. 2002. No. 5. P.63–79; *Filitov A. M. Germaniia v sovetskom vneshnepoliticheskom planirovanii*. 1941–1990. Moscow, 2009. P.138–173.

<sup>35</sup> *Dnevniky tov. A. Y. Vyshinskogo po SShA* // AVP RF. F.07. Op.27. P.50. D.274. L.3–6.

<sup>36</sup> *Ibid.* L.36–40.

<sup>37</sup> *Ibid.* L.53.

<sup>38</sup> *Ibid.* L.54–59.

archive documents mention Tamara Sharkova, Sergei Kabanchuk and Eva Bobrovich<sup>39</sup>. The Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs demanded the repatriation of these children to the USSR in accordance with the Soviet-American agreement of February 11, 1945. Tamara Sharkova (Tereza Kihoe) remained in the United States and visited her homeland for the first time in 2008<sup>40</sup>. Unfortunately, the fate of the other children mentioned in the Soviet-American diplomatic correspondence remains unknown.

Much of Kennan's time was spent corresponding with Soviet authorities regarding adapting a convention on protecting the fur seals in the Northern waters of the Pacific Ocean and the adjacent seas. In 1948, the USSR and the United States expressed a desire to begin negotiations regarding the adaptation of a convention protecting fur seals, with regard to their commercial value and widespread poaching. The American position stated that the convention should be based on scientific data regarding the location, migration, and sustenance of seals. The United States and Japan conducted two scientific expeditions in 1949 and 1950. On January 31, 1952, the United States invited the USSR to join the new expedition, which was to begin in February and conclude in July, and provided a detailed program and budget. The United States took upon itself all of the expenses related to vessel charter, lab equipment maintenance, as well as general administrative expenses, while the participating countries' governments only had to delegate scientists to join the expedition<sup>41</sup>. The Soviet government declared that it did not see the need for scientific research and even suspected the expedition of pursuing commercial rather than scientific goals<sup>42</sup>. American diplomats once again emphasized the importance of scientific data in a note dated by March 20, 1952. They provided the USSR with preliminary research reports<sup>43</sup>. The Soviet government was persistent and demanded the cancellation of the expedition in 1952 and prohibition of 3000 fur seal capture, which was provided for by the plan of the scientific research activities<sup>44</sup>.

Upon becoming an ambassador, Kennan actively joined the discussion of the convention issue. On June 16, a statement signed by the ambassador was addressed to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the USSR, refuting the Soviet protest of the significant damage inflicted on the Soviet fur seal industry by the joint Japanese-American expeditions. The document emphasized that "only 22 seals were captured in connection with the research begun in 1949, and as a result of the research, 453 seals were captured. All seals were captured in the fishing areas near the shore of Japan... Since the number of seals captured was insignificant, it could not have had a serious negative impact on the Soviet seal herds"<sup>45</sup>. In response, American diplomats received a Soviet memorandum dated by August 4, 1952, with new accusations — it claimed that the scientific expeditions were only a pretext for predatory seal capture that negatively affected the Soviet seal industry since the captured seals were on the migration routes to the Soviet sealing grounds<sup>46</sup>. This dialogue continued until February 1957, when the Convention on Conservation of Pacific Fur Seals,

<sup>39</sup> Noty otdela SShA posol'stvu SShA v Moskve // AVP RF. F. 0129. Op. 36. P. 253. D. 1. L. 121–123.

<sup>40</sup> *Gruznevich V. Sud'by liudskie // Belarus' segodnia*. 2014. 4 sentiabria. URL: <http://www.sb.by/obshchestvo/article/sudby-lyudskie.html> (accessed: 14.10.2021).

<sup>41</sup> Lichnye pis'ma t. Vyshinskogo A. Y. ... L. 4–8.

<sup>42</sup> Noty otdela SShA posol'stvu SShA v Moskve. L. 19–21.

<sup>43</sup> Lichnye pis'ma t. Vyshinskogo A. Y. ... L. 11–13.

<sup>44</sup> Noty otdela SShA posol'stvu SShA v Moskve. L. 49–50.

<sup>45</sup> Lichnye pis'ma t. Vyshinskogo A. Y. ... L. 17–18.

<sup>46</sup> Noty otdela SShA posol'stvu SShA v Moskve. L. 92–94.

which provided for scientific research, prohibition of fur seal harvesting to the north of the 30°N, and the creation of a Commission on the Northern Pacific basin fur seals, was signed.

Another problematic area was related to the interference of American-sponsored stations by the Soviet radio. For example, an inquiry dated on June 4, 1952, mentioned regular interference created by the “Radio Krug” station located in Vladivostok<sup>47</sup>. On July 2 the Americans sent a statement containing a list of five Soviet radio stations, including the specific date and time of interference<sup>48</sup>. Another letter contained references to the Soviet station RYK2 that violated radio transmission rules<sup>49</sup>. On July 29, a station with RPS call letters interfered with US reception of signals from the JAG4 station located in Tokyo<sup>50</sup>. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs rerouted the inquiries to Ministry of Communications, but Soviet responses were always identical and confirmed that “the Soviet Union acts in strict compliance with frequency registration in the Bern frequency directory”<sup>51</sup>. The only response that differed from this was a declaration that there was no “Krug” radio station in the Soviet Union<sup>52</sup>.

Another issue that attracted the attention of American embassy staff in 1952 was cinematographic piracy. According to US diplomats, the demonstration of American films, such as “The Three Musketeers”, “Meet John Doe”, “Mr. Smith Goes to Washington”, “Viva Villa!” and “Mr. Deeds Goes to Town” occurred with gross violations of copyright. At the request of US film production companies, embassy staff demanded that all copies of the films be destroyed. On April 11, 1952, the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the USSR gave the official position on the issue: the films were brought back by the Soviet army from Germany following the defeat of the German army near Berlin. Therefore, the request to turn them over to the US film production companies was ungrounded<sup>53</sup>. “The Three Musketeers”, which was demonstrated under an agreement with “20<sup>th</sup> Century Fox”, was the only exception. Its copies were destroyed, and an act confirming their destruction was handed over to the production company in June 1946<sup>54</sup>. Despite this, on August 30, 1952, a new inquiry from the US embassy signed by Kennan was received, demanding that all copies of the aforementioned films be returned to their lawful owners, since private property could not be considered a legitimate military trophy solely for the reason of having been found on enemy territory<sup>55</sup>. However, this inquiry remained unanswered, and the demonstration of American films continued.

American diplomats strove to resolve various trade issues. For example, there was the lawsuit of Fidelis Trading Company against the owners of the Kristina Thorden vessel for compensation of damage suffered by the company as a result of 35 spoiled barrels of caviar. In this case, some caviar was shipped from Leningrad in 1947 on the “Sestroretsk” vessel, then transferred to Kristina Thorden in Stockholm. The US Embassy acted as a mediator between the Soviet government and American trading company. The Embassy

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<sup>47</sup> Noty posol'stva SShA v Moskve otdelu stran Ameriki. L. 103–104.

<sup>48</sup> Noty posol'stva SShA v Moskve otdelu stran Ameriki (tom 2 i poslednii). L. 1–2.

<sup>49</sup> Ibid. L. 48.

<sup>50</sup> Ibid. L. 39–40.

<sup>51</sup> Noty otdela SShA posol'stvu SShA v Moskve. L. 16–17.

<sup>52</sup> Ibid. L. 78.

<sup>53</sup> Ibid. L. 43.

<sup>54</sup> Ibid. L. 44.

<sup>55</sup> Noty posol'stva SShA v Moskve otdelu stran Ameriki (tom 2 i poslednii). L. 54.

sent an inquiry to the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs asking to confirm the shipment of caviar in 35 barrels and to sign off on quality specifications<sup>56</sup>. The Soviet side cooperated with the Americans in this matter, turning the documentation over in a timely fashion<sup>57</sup>. Another complicated trade issue concerned an Iransovtrans' lawsuit against the American government on the failure to pay 140 410,44 rubles for the cargo shipped on behalf of the American embassy in Moscow during World War II<sup>58</sup>. As the investigation of this complex issue proceeded, the American Embassy at the request of the Comptroller General of the United States demanded additional documents and commentary regarding the cargo shipping tariffs<sup>59</sup>.

Another issue that Ambassador Kennan had to face was related to the American Embassy building in Moscow. On July 16, 1952, the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs received a request issuing for a diplomatic visa to Leland W. King, Jr., head of the Division of Foreign Buildings. The purpose of his visit was stated as the need to assist Ambassador Kennan in selecting an appropriate building for the embassy "in view of the Soviet government's decision not to extend since December 31, 1952 the term of lease of the Embassy building" on 13/15 Mokhovaia street<sup>60</sup>. The efforts were apparently successful, and in January 1953, American diplomats were already moving into the building located on Chaikovskogo street (currently Novinskii Boulevard).

Thus during the months from May to September 1952, American diplomats who worked in the Soviet Union under Kennan's authority dealt more with the routine affairs of representing American citizens' interests in the USSR rather than actively participated in generating solutions to the key issues in the Soviet-American relations. Such a situation allowed Kennan to investigate the operations of the American Embassy in Moscow and to better comprehend the post-war Soviet reality. The Ambassador's official reports reflected a growing concern with the increasing complication of diplomatic procedures and an exceeding preoccupation with intelligence activities. With a certain yearning he recalled "the good old dispatch form — that of the personal address by a chief of mission to a theoretically interested Secretary of State"<sup>61</sup>, now there were too many structures and institutions that interfered with the embassy's operations — CIA, National Security Council, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Policy Planning Staff. Kennan considered active engagement of embassy staff in espionage, encouraged by military institutions and intelligence agencies, to be a significant hindrance to regular diplomatic work as well as a serious risk to diplomats and their family members. As a solution, he proposed to appeal to the US intelligence agencies pointing out that involvement of American diplomatic representatives in Moscow in espionage would be damaging to American interests and would threaten the lives of diplomats. He insisted that an official statement limiting all public activities of the diplomats that might be considered illegitimate or in violation of the laws of the USSR be issued<sup>62</sup>. In fact, State Department members did hold unofficial discussions with the

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<sup>56</sup> Noty posol'stva SShA v Moskve... L. 77–78.

<sup>57</sup> Noty otdela SShA posol'stvu SShA v Moskve. L. 135.

<sup>58</sup> Ibid. L. 95.

<sup>59</sup> Noty posol'stva SShA v Moskve otdelu stran Ameriki (tom 2 i poslednii). L. 100–101.

<sup>60</sup> Ibid. L. 25.

<sup>61</sup> The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Kennan) to the Deputy Under Secretary of State (Matthews). July 15, 1952 // FRUS. 1952–1954. Vol. VIII. P. 1021.

<sup>62</sup> The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Kennan) to the Deputy Under Secretary of State (Matthews). June 18, 1952 // FRUS. 1952–1954. Vol. VIII. P. 1004–1009.

heads of intelligence agencies, reaching agreements on cooperation and acknowledging the priority of diplomatic interests.

One of the mysteries of Kennan's ambassadorship to Moscow is that he was declared *persona non grata*, which complicated Soviet-American relations. In September 1952, Kennan set out from Moscow to London to attend a meeting for American diplomats. On the way, he stopped in West Berlin and gave an interview to Western journalists. It focused on the conditions for foreign diplomats in the Soviet Union. The next day, the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs received a telephone message from the Soviet Control Commission advisor in the German Democratic Republic, V. S. Semenov. He complained that Kennan had claimed that the atmosphere in the Soviet-American relations was "icy", and that Americans in the Soviet capital were subject to strict regulations. In the ambassador's opinion, any ordinary communication with Russians was impossible. The general predicament of foreigners in the USSR was comparable to that which he had found when interned in Germany during the years 1941–1942<sup>63</sup>. Kennan never denied that he did, in fact, compare the situation in the USSR and Nazi Germany. As he emotionally depicted in his memoirs: "The reporters were indeed there, at the airport. They asked the expected questions. I reeled off the prepared answers. But then one young reporter — from the Paris Herald Tribune, if my memory is correct — asked me whether we in our embassy had many social contacts with Russians in Moscow. The question itself annoyed me... The regime of isolation applied to Western diplomats in Moscow had been in existence for a least two decades. How could reporter not know that? 'Don't you know', I asked, 'how foreign diplomats live in Moscow?' 'No', he replied. 'How do they?'... 'Well,' I said, 'I was interned here in Germany for several months during the last war. The treatment we receive in Moscow is just about like the treatment we internees received then, except that in Moscow we are at liberty to go out and walk the streets under guard'"<sup>64</sup>.

On September 20, Minister A. Y. Vyshinskii demanded a report on Kennan and the translation of his most well-known publications at that time — "The Sources of Soviet Conduct" and "America and the Russian Future" from the USA department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the USSR<sup>65</sup>. The report differed significantly from the one provided at the time of Kennan's appointment as ambassador. This report concluded: "Kennan is a rampant reactionary, an avid enemy of the USSR, one of the ideologists of America's aggressive foreign policy, which is aimed at preparing a war against the Soviet Union and the countries of people's democracy"<sup>66</sup>. Other parts of the report are of great interest. For example, significant attention is paid to the early stages of Kennan's diplomatic career and his diplomatic service in Riga, when the so-called Riga school was headed by the "avid enemy of the Soviet Union McGowan, who was stationed with Kolchak in Siberia in 1919 and served in 1920–1921 as American Consul in Vladivostok. The 'Riga school' was also home to the well-known anti-Soviet activist and spy Loy W. Henderson, who is currently serving as US ambassador to Iran"<sup>67</sup>. The report emphasized Kennan's pro-Nazi views and his tight contacts with Nazi diplomats during his service in the Soviet Union

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<sup>63</sup> Politicheskie voprosy. L. 20.

<sup>64</sup> Kennan G. F. *Memoirs*, 1950–1963. P. 158–159.

<sup>65</sup> Ob otzve Kennana s posta posla SShA v SSSR // AVP RF. F. 07. Op. 276. P. 67a. D. 8. L. 22.

<sup>66</sup> Ibid.

<sup>67</sup> Ibid.

in 1933–1937. The reference source was “The Truth about American Diplomats”, a book authored by Annabelle Bucar, who was an ex-staff member of the US State Department and the US Embassy in Moscow, and later requested political asylum in the USSR. Kennan’s Germanophilia was beyond doubt<sup>68</sup>, but identifying him with the Nazis was a gross mistake. Finally, Kennan’s behavior during the Victory Day is referenced by Ralph Parker, a British journalist who did not conceal his pro-Soviet attitude, when the former is cited as saying spitefully: “They think that the war is over. But it’s only the beginning”<sup>69</sup>. Kennan provided his own version of the incident. According to him, in a conversation with Parker he expressed the idea that Soviet citizens still had much to endure before the country fully recuperated and living conditions became better<sup>70</sup>. Thus, the Soviet report was based on opinions of rather biased individuals and created an image of Kennan as a long-standing and steadfast enemy of the Soviet Union.

Kennan’s statement resonated widely in the Soviet press and public opinion. On September 26, *Pravda* published a large editorial entitled “Slanderer under a diplomat’s mask”, which reported that the US ambassador who flew into West Berlin from Moscow made a slanderous accusation to the press, which demonstrated that he was an avid enemy of the Soviet Union<sup>71</sup>. The article made references to Parker’s recalling the episode of May 9, 1945. Such circumstances acutely challenged the possibility of Kennan’s continuation of his work in Moscow, and Kennan understood this perfectly. On the same day that the editorial was published, Kennan sent a report to the State Department where he expressed his readiness to remain in Europe until Washington made a decision about his future. Kennan also noted that he did not regret making such “anti-Soviet” statements since he had never concealed the details of the foreign diplomatic isolation regime implemented by the Soviet Union. He admitted, however, that his statements could have been made in a less sensational and emotional manner<sup>72</sup>. There was no need to wait for a response from Washington since the Soviet authorities made the first move.

On October 3, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the USSR A. Y. Vyshinskii presented the US Embassy representative McSweeney with a note that declared Kennan *persona non grata* for gross violation of the widely accepted conventions of international law, and demanded his immediate removal from the position of the Ambassador to the Soviet Union<sup>73</sup>. During the preparation of the text of this official note, A. Y. Vyshinskii presented a draft of the document to V. M. Molotov with a note: “Need your approval. I have doubts about the “*persona non grata*” phrase, should we exclude it?”<sup>74</sup> Kennan later proposed a hypothesis that the initiative for declaring him *persona non grata* belonged to I. V. Stalin personally<sup>75</sup>, but the available archive materials do not support this hypothesis — the note was prepared by Minister A. Y. Vyshinskii, with approval from ex-Minister V. M. Molotov. In the course of the meeting on October 3, McSweeney asked A. Y. Vyshinskii whether the

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<sup>68</sup> Hixson W. George F. Kennan: Cold War Iconoclast. P. 15; Harper J. American Visions of Europe. P. 175; Mayers D. George Kennan and the Dilemmas of U. S. Foreign Policy. P. 239.

<sup>69</sup> Ob otzyve Kennana s posta posla SShA v SSSR. L. 22.

<sup>70</sup> A Conversation George F. Kennan and George Urban. P. 42–43.

<sup>71</sup> Klevetnik pod maskoi diplomata // Pravda. 1952. 26 sentiabria.

<sup>72</sup> The Ambassador to the Soviet Union (Kennan) to the Department of State. London, September 26, 1952 // FRUS. 1952–1954. Vol. VIII. P. 1048–1051.

<sup>73</sup> Politicheskii voprosy. L. 26.

<sup>74</sup> Ibid. L. 23.

<sup>75</sup> A Conversation. George F. Kennan and George Urban. P. 42.

ambassador's airplane could be used by his family to depart from the Soviet Union and received a positive response<sup>76</sup>. On October 9, the plane with Mrs. Kennan, their two children — Christopher and Wendy, as well as the maid, Ms. Gansted, left Moscow<sup>77</sup>.

State Secretary Acheson expressed full support of the ambassador from the very outset of the incident, having noted in his statement for the press: "Ambassador Kennan is recognized not only in this country but throughout the world as a man deeply versed in knowledge of the Soviet Union and sympathetic to the legitimate aspirations of the Russian peoples. There is no doubt that the request of the Soviet Government reflects their knowledge that the factual statement Ambassador Kennan made in Berlin on September 19, will be recognized in most parts of the world as a truthful one"<sup>78</sup>. On October 8, the State Department addressed an official protest note regarding the situation around the ambassador, which noted that "Ambassador Kennan's statement accurately and in moderate language described the position of foreign diplomats accredited to the Soviet Government. It is this treatment of diplomatic representatives, systematically applied over a period of years by the Soviet Government, which grossly violates the traditions and customs in international intercourse developed over generations"<sup>79</sup>. The US government denounced the accusations brought by the Soviet government and did not consider them a compelling reason to recall Ambassador Kennan. The Soviet authorities, however, remained adamant, and once again emphasized in the note of October 13, 1952 that the position of the USSR regarding Ambassador Kennan was irrevocable<sup>80</sup>. The situation with the diplomatic note exchange was reported in detail by the *Izvestiia* newspaper in its "At the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the USSR" section<sup>81</sup>, with the appropriate permission received from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

In turn, the Soviet Embassy in America closely followed the reaction of the press to the expulsion of Kennan. One Embassy report (1952) mentioned that "the general tone of the commentaries is marked by rampant enmity towards the Soviet Union", and stoked anti-Soviet hysteria in the country<sup>82</sup>. Judging by this report, the variety of opinions expressed on the pages of American newspapers was extremely wide, from urges to deport the Soviet Ambassador and break off diplomatic relations with the USSR to careful commentaries that considered statements made by Kennan inappropriate for diplomats.

Despite their publicly demonstrated support, President Truman and State Secretary D. Acheson recommended that Kennan stay in Europe until the end of the US presidential elections, and it was only in November 1952 that the ex-ambassador returned home. Following the victory of Dwight Eisenhower and the appointment of J. F. Dulles as Secretary of State, Kennan left diplomatic service and turned to academic research at the Institute for Advanced Study in Princeton. Only in 1961–1963 at the initiative of President J. F. Kennedy did Kennan once again agree to head a US mission abroad, now in Yugoslavia.

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<sup>76</sup> Lichnye pis'ma t. Vyshinskogo A. Y. ... L. 75–76.

<sup>77</sup> Noty posol'stva SShA v Moskve otdelu stran Ameriki (tom 2 i poslednii). L. 108.

<sup>78</sup> Editorial Note // FRUS. 1952–1954. Vol. VIII. P. 1053.

<sup>79</sup> Politicheskies voprosy. L. 35.

<sup>80</sup> Ibid. L. 40–41.

<sup>81</sup> V Ministerstve inostrannyh del SSSR // *Izvestiia*. 1952. 4 oktiabria; V Ministerstve inostrannyh del SSSR // *Izvestiya*. 1952. 14 oktyabrya.

<sup>82</sup> Iz politicheskogo otcheta posol'stva SSSR v SSHA za III kvartal 1952 g. 13 oktiabria // Sovetsko-amerikanskies otnosheniia. 1949–1952. P. 608–609.

Thus, Kennan's third official stay in Moscow as a diplomat ended with few achievements. He felt that being declared *persona non grata* was a professional failure. This became one of his most painful and oppressive memories for years to come. Trying to understand the reasons behind this incident, Kennan later noted: "I was probably too highly strung emotionally, too imaginative, too sensitive, and too impressed with the importance of my own opinions, to sit quietly on that particular seat"<sup>83</sup>. It's likely that Kennan was indeed burdened by his service as an ambassador in Moscow, being almost completely cut off from discussing key issues and problems of international policy, and could not contain his discontent. Under isolation, the impossibility of direct dialogue with Soviet authorities, and the lack of clear instructions from his superiors made his job impossible. Kennan was forced to acknowledge the pointlessness of his efforts in building cooperation between America and the USSR. He became convinced not only of the Soviet political system's bureaucratic inertia and clumsiness, its excessive centralization and its total focus on Stalin's personality, but also of the extreme straightforwardness and uncompromising nature of US foreign policy towards the USSR. Kennan's stay in Moscow in 1952 definitely made him an adherent of political realism, the main principle of which implies a clear understanding of the state's national interests and acceptable methods and means in defending them.

The archival materials concerning the Soviet-American relations in 1952 provide clear evidence that the diplomatic corps faced severe difficulties under the conditions of military and political confrontation of the Cold War. Elaboration of solutions to key international problems, including issues of preventing and resolving military conflicts, was often conducted without regard to the opponent's position, and was oriented solely to internal exigencies and goals. The fundamental principles of diplomacy — striving for an open dialogue and constructive cooperation, ability to compromise, defending national interests on the basis of an adequate assessment of international climate — all of these were forgotten in the midst of the Cold War.

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<sup>83</sup> Kennan G. F. *Memoirs, 1950–1963*. P. 166–167.

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